Limited Epistocracy and Political Inclusion by Jeffrey, Anne
 1 
Limited Epistocracy and Political Inclusion 
Anne Jeffrey 
(penultimate draft; forthcoming in Episteme) 
 
In this paper I defend a form of epistocracy I call limited 
epistocracy— rule by institutions housing expertise in non-political 
areas that become politically relevant. This kind of limited 
epistocracy, I argue, isn’t a far-off fiction. With increasing frequency, 
governments are outsourcing political power to expert institutions to 
solve urgent, multidimensional problems because they outperform 
ordinary democratic decision-making. I consider the objection that 
limited epistocracy, while more effective than its competitors, lacks a 
fundamental intrinsic value that its competitors have; namely, 
political inclusion. After explaining this challenge, I suggest that 
limited epistocracies can be made compatible with robust political 
inclusion if specialized institutions are confined to issuing directives 
that give citizens multiple actionable options. I explain how this 
safeguards citizens’ inclusion through rational deliberation, choice, 
and contestation. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Recently, many governments have been addressing urgent, 
multidimensional problems like climate change, the Ebola and Zika 
outbreaks, and the Syrian refugee crisis by turning over the reins to 
expert institutions. Groups like the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) can provide better 
solutions to these problems than individual experts because, as 
William Rehg aptly puts it, “the multidisciplinary complexity of the 
technical issues exceeds the technical expertise of any one person,” 
(2011, p. 386). When such issues arise, our best hope of resolving 
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them effectively lies in deferring to institutions with specialized 
knowledge.  
In this paper I defend the form of government best equipped 
to resolve these kinds of complex problems: limited epistocracy. 
Limited epistocracy, as I’ll define it, is qualified rule by expert 
institutions, where the institutions get their political authority in 
virtue of their specialized knowledge and their ability to generate 
optimal solutions in the way of, for instance, health, environmental 
sustainability, technological security, and border regulation. My main 
aim is to show that limited epistocracy is a viable and preferable 
alternative to democracy because of its ability to produce better 
outcomes while also realizing the value of political inclusion (a value 
typically associated with democratic regimes).  
After defining limited epistocracy, I explain why we should 
think of it as a serious and attractive form of rule distinct from 
democracy. Then I consider what I take to be the most formidable 
objections to limited epistocracy that might be leveled by democrats. 
First, democrats might object that limited epistocracy won’t be 
legitimate because it doesn’t satisfy a liberal principle that 
democracy does. Second, democrats could object that limited 
epistocracy could result in certain groups being unfairly excluded 
from political participation. I respond to each of these objections in 
turn.  
If the defense is successful, at best it will show that limited 
epistocracy can do better than democracy and protect a central 
democratic value— political inclusion. At worst, if democrats still 
want to argue that democracy can take on board much of what I 
suggest without collapsing into limited epistocracy, then my 
argument will reveal that democrats are willing to concede much 
more in the way of the intrinsic values that make democracy 
distinctive— like protection of individual liberties and political 
participation— than we might expect.  
 
2  Specialized Institutions As Epistocrats  
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There are doubtless many kinds of epistocracy we might aptly 
describe as “limited  epistocracy.”1  The variety of limited epistocracy 
I want to defend is rule by a certain kind of organized body of 
experts, which I’ll call a specialized institution, with the political 
power to make decisions and issue commands in the area of their 
expertise.  A specialized institution’s rule is limited in the sense that 
the domain in which it’s authorized is circumscribed by its expertise. 
If organizations like the WHO, IPCC, and WTO ever function as 
specialized institutions in my sense (and I’m going to suggest that on 
occasion, they have), it is usually ad hoc and temporary or over a 
narrow domain, where they are authorized to resolve some 
particularly pressing issue facing the nation(s) that empower them.  
This variety of limited epistocracy is of interest for a few 
reasons. It avoids seemingly intractable disagreements about what 
suffices for political expertise because the expertise of specialized 
institutions is not primarily political. Instead, it’s expertise in 
subjects like medicine, public health, or climate science, that neither 
the average citizen nor elected political officials can be expected to 
have. The epistemic communities in those areas already have 
standards by which they judge who qualifies as an expert. Critics of 
wholesale epistocracy are quick to point out that fairly settling the 
question of who counts as a political expert would be a formidable 
task. For one thing, as the literature on moral disagreement and 
moral expertise shows us, rampant disagreement on evaluative 
matters can easily lead to skepticism about moral knowledge and 
expertise altogether. For another, if there are moral or political 
experts, we can’t check their expertise by seeing if their predictions 
and products hold up without already adopting a certain moral or 
political standard for evaluation, which could be wrong. But that 
won’t be a problem for this kind of limited epistocracy. There is not 
widespread disagreement among non-experts as to who has expertise 
in social or hard sciences; the experts are generally regarded as 
                                                            
1 Jason Brennan, for instance, proposes a variety in which a state grants universal suffrage 
with epistocratic veto. Since the epistocrats’ power is limited to striking down, rather than 
creating, laws, we could call this a limited epistocracy (2016, pp. 215-218). Thomas 
Christiano describes a system in which all citizens can make determinations about the aims 
of their society, but experts decide on the means to achieving those aims (2006). 
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experts because we trust their credentials. The epistemic 
communities in the areas of these institutions’ specialization have 
established standards for judging expertise which non-experts rely on 
in evaluating others as experts. Those standards being external to 
politics, we don’t need to worry that political biases will pollute the 
process of designating individuals and institutions as experts.  
Additionally, this kind of limited epistocracy incorporates an 
insight of Aristotle’s offered by democrats as a reason to resist full 
epistocracy. The insight is that rule by a group of fairly wise 
individuals could outperform rule by the wisest individual, since 
deliberation with the group could produce better results than 
unchecked judgments of an individual even when the average 
competence is slightly lower in the group.2 Helene Landemore puts 
the objection this way: “Epistocracy is not a tempting option…not 
because we can never agree on who the knowers are, or because there 
are no knowers whose expertise is beyond other citizens’ reasonable 
objections… but because the more reliable knower is actually the 
group as a whole, as opposed to any particular individual or group of 
individuals within it,” (2012, p. 10). Since specialized institutions 
incorporate a large number of experts of varying, but still high, levels 
of competence, their outputs will likely be superior to those that an 
individual— say, a singular genius in the field—would generate. 
In a specialized institution, the experts are equipped to decide 
and act quickly in emergencies. Unlike a group of people who happen 
to be experts in some area but have no experience collaborating with 
each other, a specialized institution has established procedures for 
joint problem solving.3 They would handily outperform a purely 
democratic regime or even a regime where democratically elected 
officials were advised by experts but held ultimate decision-making 
power. So, if any form of epistocracy stands a chance of appealing 
even to those democrats who have raised epistemic worries about 
epistocracy, limited epistocracy does.  
                                                            
2 For thorough discussion of this criticism see Estlund (2008, pp. 208-209). 
3 Henry Richardson points out four reasons why specialized institutions with expertise are 
indispensible to collaborative reasoning: they “catalyze a moment of joint decision,” they 
authorize “certain individuals...to play certain roles,” they “constitute the group as a 
reasoner,” and the “distinctive institutional structure will help a collective agent achieve this 
kind of decisional autonomy,” (2012, pp. 100-101). 
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Let’s consider the features a specialized institution qualified 
for this kind of epistocratic governance would need to have. For one 
thing, it will have a unique relationship to a body of information. 
The knowledge housed in a specialized institution is not common: it’s 
neither acquirable nor surveyable by non-experts.4 For example, what 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) knows 
about the impact of reduction of population in Japan and the 
simultaneous hike in oil prices on climate change is something the 
average citizen or political official would not understand, even if the 
informational basis of the knowledge were made public. It’s not just 
that the average citizen or elected official can’t be expected to have 
this knowledge. And it’s not just that an institution like the IPCC 
has more resources in the way of high quality inputs and time to 
review those findings to acquire the knowledge. The content of the 
knowledge is simply not something that non-experts could work out 
together given time and availability of research on the subject 
matter.5 Moreover, even individual experts contributing to, say, the 
IPCC’s investigations, might not grasp the information sufficiently to 
have knowledge of it. Often, single members just can’t hold all the 
relevant information in their heads in the way necessary for 
understanding it, much less figuring out an optimal solution. The 
institutional procedures for integrating information across disciplines 
give it more powerful computational abilities than individual agents.6  
Specialized institutions’ knowledge is also optimal: given the 
available research and methods for processing data, that knowledge is 
the most accurate we can currently hope to have. If put to the test, 
the specialized institution will reliably outperform individuals and 
groups of non-experts in getting the correct answers on the subject 
matter of its expertise.  
                                                            
4 To avoid narrowing the account I will not tie what I say going forward to a particular 
theory of how an institution or group can come to possess information, have beliefs, or have 
knowledge. I will assume for the purpose of the argument that there is nothing deeply 
misleading about the phenomenon of an institution having some informational output that is 
not thoroughly understood by any member of the institution, but which is nonetheless 
epistemically superior to information an individual could provide.  
5 It’s tempting to object, here, that the latest research on collective problem-solving and 
decision-making undermines this claim. But see Ancell (2016) for response to this objection. 
6 For more on how to model such procedures where values and scientific data are both at 
play, see Huebner and Kukla (2014).  
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Because the institutional knowledge is optimal and not 
common, a special institution is in a position of privileged epistemic 
standing. It has epistemic authority over non-experts because it has 
the best evidence and information on the subject matter of its 
expertise. In virtue of the specialized institution’s epistemic 
authority, would be epistemically irrational for a non-expert to 
believe what’s contrary to what the specialized institution says 
without defeaters or higher order reasons against trusting the 
institution. Linda Zagzebski helpfully explains that an epistemic 
authority gives a subject a reason to believe her because, by doing so, 
the subject better conforms to the epistemic reasons that apply to 
her (2012, pp. 89-93). A specialized institution has the authority to 
change what believers are rationally permitted and required to 
believe on the basis of what it says should and shouldn’t be believed.7  
Finally, specialized institutions create outputs that citizens 
can be required to comply with on pain of punishment. When the 
World Trade Organization rendered a verdict ratifying the European 
Union ban on trading seal products, after Canada and Nordic states 
had contested the ban, the output wasn’t just new evidence for 
believing that a seal ban would effectively protect the environment 
without creating economic distress. It was a practically binding 
directive for citizens in the EU: no commercial trading of any seal 
products except in indigenous and Inuit communities.  
This condition importantly allows us to distinguish those 
institutions that might merely provide information that can serve as 
input to shape practical policy from those actually making policy and 
issuing directives that license state use of coercive power. The 
institutions themselves will not carry out coercion; just as the 
members of Parliament do not themselves apply and enforce the laws 
they ratify but charge law enforcement agencies with this task, so too 
the law enforcement agencies and judiciary of a government will be 
charged with applying and meting out the punishments outlined by 
                                                            
7 This way of carving up the domain of influence a specialized institution has just in virtue 
of its knowledge keeps us from committing what political philosophers have called the 
expert/boss fallacy (Estlund 2008, p. 207). 
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specialized institutions.8 In the United States, elected officials in 
Congress rely on recommendations of public health experts at elite 
universities or think tanks when crafting laws; but those institutions 
aren’t specialized institutions in my sense, since they are just that— 
recommendations. The power to determine how that information 
should guide law and policy remains in the hands of the elected 
members of the government, and what makes the laws and policies 
binding on the people is that they’re ratified by the elected officials. 
Ultimately, then, this form of governing is democratic rather than 
epistocratic. By contrast, in the kind of limited epistocracy I want to 
consider here, the very same institution that has epistemic 
authority— the right to be believed about what should be done— 
also has practical authority— the right to be obeyed.9 There isn’t an 
intermediary body issuing practical directives that ought to be 
followed but that citizens would be rational in disbelieving about 
what ought to be done. Specialized institutions that can serve as 
epistocratic bodies are those whose outputs that can be turned into 
authoritative directives without going through a democratically 
elected official. I’ll leave further discussion of this point to the next 
section.   
Summing up, an organization is a specialized institution in my 
sense only when it (i) houses expertise that constitutes optimal, non-
common knowledge about a subject matter that isn’t primarily 
political, (ii) has epistemic standing to be believed on a particular 
subject matter of practical importance, and (iii) issues practical 
verdicts, judgments, and policies that can bind citizens to a certain 
course of action backed by coercive power.  
 
3   Is Rule by Specialized Institutions Epistocratic? 
 
I want to address two concerns about this way of characterizing 
limited epistocracy. The first is that the system of rule I’ve described 
                                                            
8 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for calling for clarity about the coercive powers of 
specialized institutions.  
9 I assume Hohfeld’s schema of correlative rights and duties in what follows—that a duty to 
obey the authority correlates to a right of that authority to be obeyed—and I apply the 
same language to epistemic authority.  
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isn’t really epistocratic because it’s democracy heavily influenced by 
the experts, or what political scientists call “representative 
bureaucracy.” State elected officials turn over power to specialized 
bodies all the time and we don’t for this reason think of the state as 
undemocratic. The second worry is that specialized institutions as 
I’ve described them don’t exist, and so neither does my favored form 
of limited epistocracy.  
Turning to the first concern: Suppose that there are 
specialized institutions. As long as they’re getting their practical 
authority from elected officials or bodies, it seems like their rule isn’t 
properly epistocratic. Take the European Chemicals Agency’s 
(ECHA) regulation of products on the market as an example. The 
agency has de facto authority in deciding that products containing 
ammonium nitrate with more than 16% nitrate by weight can’t be 
used by farmers (2006). But, the ECHA gets the de facto authority 
to do this from democratically elected members of the EU Parliament 
via the EU Commission. The ECHA doesn’t enforce its regulations, 
either. It relies on national law enforcement to punish non-
compliance. It doesn’t seem like France is a limited epistocracy just 
because it hands over a narrow power to decide whether ammonium 
nitrate products can enter the market or be used to the ECHA.  
It might be that when an expert body like the ECHA only has 
de facto, not de jure, practical authority in virtue of its special 
knowledge, it isn’t a specialized institution in my sense. Arguably, 
independent agencies in the United States government fail to be 
specialized institutions because they aren’t ruling in virtue of their 
expertise. Rather, their de jure authority comes from the sanction of 
elected officials—the President and Congress, and contingently they 
do happen to actually have the expertise they purport to have. Sure, 
the elected officials might have appointed them because of their 
considering the institution one of expertise, but they could have just 
as well appointed the think-tank owned and operated by a Congress 
member’s family because of their connection.  
Suppose we don’t want to concede that the United States 
system of government is subject to this kind of influence by factors 
not having to do with expertise. Consider an organization like the US 
Department of Education; the policy experts that compose that 
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governmental body hold their positions largely because of their 
knowledge. The recognition of this institution’s authority currently 
depends on the appointment of the Secretary by the President and 
approval from Congress. However, perhaps its right to rule—its de 
jure authority—doesn’t depend on democratically elected officials’ 
approval and backing, contrary to appearances. Perhaps it depends 
rather on the quality of the expertise housed in it. If we wanted to 
describe a system of government like the United States’ as a limited 
epistocracy, then, we would need to say that the democratic branches 
of government just happen to express approval of institutions 
housing experts, but their authority is held purely in virtue of their 
expertise.  
This suggests a more general way of resisting the objection 
that there are no specialized institutions: push back on the 
description of the ECHA and similar cases. Although it looks like the 
democratic body gives the specialized institution its authority, what 
if the institution’s authority doesn’t actually depend on its being 
selected or appointed by elected officials? That is, the institution’s 
dictates would be binding even if the elected officials didn’t sign off 
on them. If a specialized institution has de jure authority in virtue of 
its expertise, then the state in which it operates with authority is 
genuinely epistocratic in this limited way. It’s a happy coincidence 
with the democratically elected branch of the government recognizes 
the authority the epistocratic branch has due to its special 
knowledge.  
In a government like that of the US, regulatory and 
independent agencies that house expertise like the EPA and FEMA 
could improve dramatically in efficacy if directors weren’t appointed 
by the executive branch (and subject to removal by the same). 
Consider the recent choice of the president elect of the United States 
to appoint a climate-change denier as head of the EPA—arguably 
with the aim of scoring political points with the far right and 
lowering regulations on capitalistic ventures in energy.  Then what 
the EPA can do to promote sustainability might be severely limited; 
unregulated carbon emissions could contribute to further climate 
damage and disastrous results in states bordering the ocean in a few 
decades.  
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Or consider FEMA, the agency responsible for coordinating 
emergency readiness and relief response efforts. The US Federal 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 eliminated the need for congressional 
approval and action after disasters, and in 1979 President Carter 
transferred over all power in disaster-related authorities to FEMA. 
Currently, the head of FEMA is appointed by the president, and a 
president or state governor has to call a state of emergency for 
FEMA’s authority to kick in. The disastrous effects of Hurricane 
Katrina and problems with FEMA’s operations in its wake 
challenged the wisdom of this arrangement. People complained that 
the director of FEMA appointed by President Bush, Michael Brown, 
had inadequate experience. They blamed him and FEMA more 
generally, for slow and inefficient response and the Louisiana 
governor and New Orleans Mayor for dragging their feet in issuing 
the state of emergency. If directors of agencies like FEMA or the 
EPA earned their positions through qualifications assessed by their 
epistemic communities, rather than by being appointed by the 
president, it’s plausible that certain disasters and crises could be 
avoided. Imagine that the National Weather Service and FEMA 
merged such that when the weather service made a determination 
about a state of emergency, FEMA’s practical authority was 
automatically triggered. Then we would have, in my view, a genuine 
limited epistocracy, where the epistocratic branch of government was 
being run by a specialized institution.  
This leads us back to the second concern, namely, that there 
aren’t any organizations that qualify as specialized institutions. 
Whether or not any institutions count as specialized institutions is of 
course largely an empirical matter. Are there organizations, ad hoc 
committees, or agencies sufficiently independent of a state’s elected 
bodies whose political power is triggered when their areas of 
specialization are at issue? One plausible, actual example of a 
specialized institution in my sense would be the World Trade 
Organization. When the WTO ruled on the EU seal ban, for 
instance, its ruling was legitimate not because it represented the will 
of the people or was accepted by elected officials who represent that 
will. It was authoritative, it seems to me, because it has political 
power justified by epistocratic principles: it should have the final say 
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because it’s the expert body. Note, too, that the response doesn’t just 
come down to the fact that the WHO and WTO are extra-
governmental agencies. The heart of the worry is about the source of 
the institution’s political power being democratic, not whether or not 
the institution is a proper part of the democratic government, so such 
a reply would miss the point. Rather, these organizations’ power 
appears to be justified not by their relationship to the will of the 
people but something else entirely, namely, their expert knowledge.  
If one doesn’t find the examples above convincing, that’s no 
reason to abandon the line of inquiry about limited epistocracy. As 
the Hurricane Katrina example makes vivid, if we don’t currently 
have limited epistocracies, we may well need them in order to avert 
disasters and better care for citizens during emergencies and crises. 
With the recent rise of populism in the United States and European 
nations, along with the evidence that the voting population is largely 
misinformed or under-informed about hard and social scientific facts 
that bear on what policies would actually best promote citizens’ 
welfare, limited epistocracy looks much more attractive than 
democracy. The effectiveness of the state in securing wellbeing would 
be dramatically increased by farming out decisions and 
implementation of policy to specialized institutions.  
 
4   Is Limited Epistocracy Legitimate?  
 
Grant for a moment that I’ve successfully argued that limited 
epistocracy is a genuinely distinct type of rule from and has more 
instrumental value than democracy. Whether the instrumental value 
of a limited epistocracy is enough to shift the argumentative burden 
from defenders of limited epistocracy to defenders of democracy will 
depend on whether there’s some further moral value at stake— 
something beyond health outcomes, safety, economic viability that 
governments owe their citizens that limited epistocracy can’t deliver. 
In this and the following sections I’ll consider potential grounds for 
rejecting limited epistocracy even if it would produce optimal 
outcomes in emergency situations on matters where politicians and 
ordinary citizens can’t claim competence.  
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For one thing, it might fail the test of legitimacy. In fact, 
critics of wholesale epistocracy allege that it succumbs to this 
problem for “one person’s having the truth does not, by itself, 
warrant their political authority over those who do not,” (Estlund 
2008, 22). For another, it’s far from obvious that the only kind of 
value a form of rule can have is instrumental— that is, the value it 
has in virtue of producing the best outcomes. So if an alternative 
form of government did better than limited epistocracy on both 
counts, it would certainly be reasonable to prefer it.  
To defend limited epistocracy against these charges, in this 
section I’ll argue that limited epistocracy meets the conditions of 
political legitimacy because it doesn’t interfere with citizens’ liberty 
except on the basis of good reasons. However, as I’ll explain in the 
next section, in a limited epistocracy, the reasons on the basis of 
which specialized institutions govern aren’t surveyable or appreciable 
to the ordinary citizen. This seems like it exacerbates the second 
worry with limited epistocracy— namely, that it won’t realize non-
instrumental values, like political inclusion, that democratic 
competitors offer. I devote the remainder of the paper to addressing 
this final worry.  
First let me say a bit about what I’m assuming legitimacy is 
and what motivates the quest for it. According to the standard state-
of-nature stories, individual liberty is the default position; states need 
a compelling reason to interfere with individual liberty, to make it 
the case that citizens can’t just do what they want but have to 
comply with the commands of the state. The state interferes with 
citizens’ liberties by coercively imposing on people a certain kind of 
social order (Pettit 2012a, pp. 59-60). To be clear, by “interference 
with liberty” I don’t mean merely that the state changes what 
citizens can do in the same way an individual or corporation does (as 
when a multi-million dollar fast-food chain bids on the empty 
storefront on the corner, demolishing the chances for a local mom-
and-pop restaurant from being able to buy it, or when someone steps 
out into the street and keeps those driving from moving past freely). 
Instead, I mean that political authorities substantively change what 
we’re permitted and required to do. If a state is legitimate, then a 
new law might create a duty to rescue, for example, and make it the 
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case that when a citizen sees someone in physical distress she’s 
required to call an ambulance or police and wait with the victim 
until they arrive. Having the power to reorganize and introduce new 
obligations into the social fabric is a huge imposition on citizens’ 
lives. So it requires special justification. I’ll follow contemporary 
political philosophers in calling this need to justify the coercive 
imposition of the social order the “burden of legitimacy” (Richardson 
2002, p. 23).  
Many defenders of democracy think that in order to discharge 
the burden of legitimacy the state has to represent the will of the 
people, or to acquire its power to rearrange permissions and duties by 
some form of consent on the part of the people. Democracy uniquely 
meets this condition. Other democrats make weaker claims but still 
tie legitimacy to the people: David Estlund, for instance, proposes an 
“acceptability requirement”: “a necessary condition on the legitimate 
exercise of political power [is] that it be justifiable in terms 
acceptable to all qualified points of view,” (Estlund 2008, p. 41).  
If this is the right way to think about legitimacy, it seems to 
spell trouble for limited epistocracy. In a limited epistocracy, the 
epistocratic branch of government which doesn’t even purport to be 
constrained by what’s acceptable to non-experts. (Recall from the 
previous section that if the governing specialized institution depended 
for its authority on appointment from elected officials, it wouldn’t be 
genuinely epistocratic and so the overall form of rule wouldn’t be a 
limited epistocracy in my sense.)  A defense of limited epistocracy on 
this point, then, has to begin with an explanation of how the 
imposition of this kind of regime could be legitimate even when the 
people don’t offer their consent and when it doesn’t give voice to 
their collective will.   
It’s initially tempting to think that democracy neatly dissolves 
the problem of legitimacy; for if the question “how a [person] can be 
both free and coerced to conform to wills which are not his own,” as 
Rousseau puts it, then an easy answer is that the will to which a 
citizen of a democracy submits is, in a sense, his own.10 But 
contemporary democrats themselves reject this position as too naive. 
                                                            
10 This is Pettit’s take on Rousseau’s suggestion (2012, p. 65).  
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The will of the majority is distinct from, and may even be at odds 
with, the individual’s will.  
The common thread in current defenses of democracy instead 
seems to be that democratic governments earn their legitimacy by 
giving reasons acceptable from all qualified perspectives of citizens for 
the coercion they impose. Here is Estlund on the Rawlsian liberal 
principle of legitimacy: “The moral idea behind this principle is that 
no person can legitimately be coerced to abide by legal rules and 
arrangements unless sufficient reasons can be given that do not 
violate that person’s reasonable moral and philosophical convictions, 
true or false, right or wrong,” (Estlund 2008, p. 43). And Richardson 
claims that the case for democracy rests on the initial premise that 
“governments must not act in an elementally arbitrary way but 
instead offer reasons for their actions,” and democracy operates 
within this constraint by giving equal considerations to each citizen 
through fair procedures (2002, p. 27). 
This takes us a step in the direction of defending limited 
epistocracy: the conditions on legitimacy described above could in 
principle be met by forms of government other than democracy, 
including limited epistocracy.  The liberal principle of legitimacy 
dovetails with the traditional republican account of legitimacy. 
According to the republican theory (recently brought into the 
foreground by Phillip Pettit’s work), the kind of freedom a state 
must allot to citizens is freedom from domination. Domination is 
understood as interference on an arbitrary basis— that is, being 
subject to another’s arbitrary will (Pettit 1997, p. 22). Richardson 
helpfully contrasts interference on an arbitrary basis with 
interference for reasons (2002, p. 27). States discharge the burden of 
legitimacy, on this view, by being constrained in their interference by 
a principle of non-domination which requires them to interfere only 
on the basis of reasons (good reasons, of course). Put this way, the 
republican account of legitimacy looks like the other side of the coin 
of the liberal principle appealed to by democrats. For the notion that 
citizens must enjoy liberty from interference on the basis of 
considerations that aren’t reasons— that wouldn’t be acceptable from 
a qualified point of view— underwrites both the liberal and 
republican accounts of legitimacy. The point of noting this, for our 
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purposes, is that if limited epistocracy interferes with liberty only on 
the basis of reasons that don’t conflict with citizens’ moral and 
philosophical convictions, then it can discharge the burden of 
legitimacy just as well as competing forms of government— 
democracy and republics.  
Specialized institutions can in fact discharge the burden of 
legitimacy so conceived. In fact, the impetus for putting a specialized 
institution in charge is precisely that they’re equipped to craft 
policies and directives more responsive to reasons bearing on issues 
than is any other agency or group. Further, specialized institutions 
will actually make decisions on the basis of the reasons they have a 
handle on through their expertise. This is true because as I’ve 
conceived of them, their power isn’t dependent on and constrained by 
parties that have orthogonal interest: lobbyists for special interest 
groups, congresspersons trying to get re-elected, or the executive 
branch pushing the party agenda. The US Environmental Protection 
Agency, for example, if freed from outside political influence, would 
make decisions on the basis of the best data available. The EPA’s 
interference with citizens’ choices won’t be arbitrary, since the 
reasons supporting their decisions are restricted to optimal scientific 
evidence and social scientific data on environmental policy outcomes. 
Neither will these reasons conflict with the values and commitments 
of citizens who inhabit qualified perspectives. A limited epistocrat 
handles the dissent from someone convinced that climate change 
science is bogus is the same as the way a democrat or republican 
would: such a perspective isn’t qualified— or, put another way, such 
a conviction can’t be shown to be reasonable. Limited epistocracy, 
then, seems to be just as well positioned to meet the burden of 
legitimacy as democracy because it licenses specialized institutions to 
interfere with citizens only on the basis of good reasons, avoiding 
arbitrary interference.   
 
5   Is Limited Epistocracy Dominating?  
 
Limited epistocracy can discharge the burden of legitimacy because it 
interferes for reasons that are acceptable to all qualified perspectives. 
However, while those reasons are in principle acceptable, they aren’t 
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actually reasons that ordinary citizens and even most elected officials 
can be expected to appreciate; being sensitive to these reasons 
requires training and knowledge non-experts lack. This might 
generate a further worry. Because the epistocratic body discerns and 
acts on reasons that are inscrutable to most citizens, it threatens to 
dominate them— not in the way that would disqualify the institution 
from legitimacy, but the kind that would undermine a fundamental 
moral and political value: political inclusion. I want to lay out the 
most formidable versions of this objection to limited epistocracy in 
this section before responding in the next two sections. 
The general argument against limited epistocracy from the 
value of political inclusion goes something like this: Specialized 
institutions impose on citizens, simultaneously, a duty to believe 
them and a duty to obey them. This limits citizens’ permissions to 
form their own beliefs about political matters, deliberate for 
themselves and with others about what the state should do, and to 
formulate reasons for contesting the governing body’s choices. But for 
citizens to participate in a way that realizes the value of political 
inclusion of all, they need to be able to form their own beliefs, voice 
their views, deliberate and formulate reasons for contesting state 
policy and action. Thus, limited epistocracy isn’t compatible with 
political inclusion of all. But political inclusion has intrinsic value; in 
fact, its value is so great that it’s better to have a state in which this 
value is realized than one which has maximal instrumental value. If 
this is right, then democracy will be preferable to limited epistocracy, 
even though limited epistocracy outperforms democracy when it 
comes to good outcomes.  
What’s controversial in the argument above is the premise 
that the joint authority of specialized institutions would keep citizens 
from being able to rationally deliberate, give voice to their own 
views, and contest the state. To lend this premise plausibility, 
consider first an analogy and then an example.  
Imagine that the head of a science lab is in a position of 
epistemic and practical authority over student researchers in her lab. 
Years of experience lead her to think a particular student project is 
doomed to fail. Suppose she’s right, but she finds herself unable to 
articulate the reasons why in terms that her students can 
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understand. If she tells them the experiments they want to run aren’t 
worthwhile, they have a pro tanto reason to believe her in virtue of 
her epistemic authority. If she demands that they scrap the  project, 
they have a pro tanto reason to obey her in virtue of her practical 
authority. What grounds could the students have to contest the lab 
director’s decision? It looks like the only way they could come up 
with a reasonable contestation is by flouting their epistemic reason to 
believe her. And the only way to come up with a countervailing 
epistemic reason or defeater is to run the experiments and get results, 
which would flout their practical reason to obey her. In the scientific 
context it doesn’t matter to us that the students’ hands are tied, 
because we don’t see an obvious scientific value in giving non-experts 
a voice in what projects to pursue (especially when projects are costly 
and resources are limited). But in the political context, it does 
matter. 
Political inclusion requires that citizens be able to rationally 
contest the decisions of their governments.11 But a specialized 
institution can give non-expert citizens a pro tanto reason to believe 
what it says about what should be done, or at least strong reasons to 
not believe the contrary of what they say; and at the same time, as 
practical authorities, they give citizens reasons to act in accordance 
with their dictates. This doesn’t subject citizens to their arbitrary 
will, since their dictates are based on reasons. So it isn’t technically a 
form of domination that would make the government illegitimate. 
However, since the reasons aren’t surveyable to citizens, citizens 
might experience one of the harms of domination— lack of political 
inclusion of their voice. Like the students in the lab, non-experts 
won’t be able to contest the political will of the limited epistocracy 
without violating some rational requirement, epistemic or practical. 
And so, though specialized institutions can meet the burden of 
legitimacy as articulated by the republican and liberal accounts, they 
still threaten to dominate citizens by stamping out their voice.  
                                                            
11 Elizabeth Anderson argues that educated citizens can still assess scientific testimony used 
in public policy-making; while this may be possible in principle, in the cases we are 
considering, the scientific body has epistemic authority that renders it epistemically 
impermissible to rely on one’s own assessment rather than the testimony of the specialized 
institution (2011).  
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To defend limited epistocracy, I could reply that the epistemic 
authority of specialized institutions doesn’t generate epistemic 
reasons strong enough to keep citizens from rationally evaluating 
proposals and declarations for themselves. In our science lab case, for 
example, the lab director certainly has a pro tanto right to be 
believed, but this doesn’t translate to an unqualified duty for the 
students to believe anything she says in the subject area of her 
expertise. A student wouldn’t be irrational to check the director’s 
credentials, or gather and consider evidence that the director might 
have a kind of myopia when it comes to the particular topic of their 
proposed project. Higher order evidence could provide reasons against 
believing the director compatible with accepting her general 
expertise. Or disagreement within the scientific community could 
provide defeaters for the belief in what her director says about the 
project. So too, one could argue, in the political case. Citizens could 
gather evidence about credentials and training of members of the 
EPA that might discredit certain individuals; they could look to the 
broader community  of environmental scientists and policy-makers to 
check the content of the EPA’s claims about what they ought to 
believe. None of these permissions— to gather evidence or look for 
defeaters from disagreement—  is incompatible with the EPA having 
epistemic authority over citizens.   
Perhaps the epistemic permissions mentioned above go far 
enough in making room for non-experts to rationally contest the 
authority. If so, then limited epistocracy doesn’t pose any special 
threat of subtle domination by undermining political inclusion. 
Political inclusion would be realizable in a limited epistocracy just as 
easily as in a democracy. That would tip the balance in favor of 
limited epistocracy, given its ability to outperform democracy in 
cases where the elected officials lack competence or make decisions 
that don’t reflect competence because of ulterior motives.  
But perhaps these epistemic permissions aren’t enough to 
secure for citizens what they need to be included. In real life cases, 
non-expert citizens need to be able to make reasonable requests and 
demands for change, contesting the decisions of the epistocratic 
branch of government. If the epistemic authority of specialized 
institutions makes it irrational for citizens to disbelieve what they 
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say ought to be done, what could be the point of their deliberating 
individually or with one another about what to do? Public dialogue  
on the issues in question would seem like nothing more than a facade 
covering up the fact that citizens were merely being given a 
Machiavellian forum to “vent” while remaining powerless. If the 
specialized institution is in the best position to craft an optimal 
proposal, then citizens would have to violate a rational requirement 
(ignoring pertinent information, discounting the testimony of experts, 
forming beliefs based on insufficient or bad evidence) to come up 
with reasons for complaint or an alternative proposal in their 
deliberations.  
At this point, an example will help us see how specialized 
institutions’ joint epistemic and practical authority could undercut 
citizens’ ability to be politically engaged and included while 
complying with epistemic and practical norms. In 2014, Liberia’s first 
line of response to the Ebola epidemic came from the Liberian 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, which created a senior 
strategy team with a technical expert committee. In late July, the 
strategy team decided that “the overall response could be further 
optimized and sought to implement improvements with technical 
support from the CDC.”12  Unfortunately, despite the collaborative 
efforts of the technical experts in epidemiology and public health on 
the strategy team, Ebola continued to spread. In hindsight, 
researchers identify as a major impediment the cultural and religious 
beliefs of non-expert citizens who refused to comply with the state 
measures.13  
These citizens weren’t in a position to rationally challenge the 
directives that strategy team went on to issue because they didn’t 
have reasons to discredit the strategy team’s epistemic authority;  
they also lacked evidence that their alternative forms of healing 
worked. As a result, the government and strategy team weren’t 
compelled to listen to their dissent. If citizens preferred the use of 
traditional medicine and spiritual healers and continued cultural 
                                                            
12 Pillai et al, “Developing an Incident Management System to Support Ebola Response— 
Liberia, July-August 2014” in CDC Weekly 63(41):930-933. 
13 Manguvo, Mafuvadze, “The Impact of Traditional Religious Practices on the Spread of 
Ebola in West Africa: Time for a Strategic Shift” Pan African Medical Journal 22(2015): 9. 
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burial practices that endangered the community, even when  there 
was ample evidence that they weren’t as effective in combatting the 
virus, that was a problem of compliance. It seems clear that in this 
case, the non-expert citizens should have deferred to the medical 
experts who were part of the state’s strategy team in forming beliefs 
about the virus and treatment methods. Thus the grounds they 
offered in contestation of the regulations, and in justifying their lack 
of compliance, were dismissed as unreasonable.  
Not only did evidence overwhelmingly favor the modern 
medical treatments; but given that the problem was so urgent, it 
would have been a waste of resources and time for these citizens to 
conduct their own experiments to justify the use of their traditional 
medical and spiritual healing practices. So gathering further evidence 
wouldn’t have been rational in this case. As a result, we see that the 
Liberian citizens were required, by practical rationality, to follow the 
government regulations and were required, by epistemic rationality,  
to believe the state about the reasons for complying with those 
regulations. Epistemic permission to consider higher order evidence 
didn’t offer them room to reasonably dissent or contest the laws 
based on their cultural or religious values. The case above seems to 
drive home the point that limited epistocracy will fail to include 
citizens in the political process through their rational deliberation 
and contestation.  
From the theoretical perspective, we can better appreciate the 
force of this challenge to limited epistocracy by looking at the 
determinants of political inclusion and considering why limited 
epistocracy would be in tension with those determinants. 
Philosophers characterize political inclusion as giving citizens “the 
right to participate in the rule of their government… making sure 
that all participants of the deliberative debate are actually allowed to 
and able to voice their views during the debate.” (Beckman 2008, p. 
348).14 Further, it’s not enough for citizens to “feel heard”; they have 
to actually be heard. Their voice must be taken up as a consideration 
bearing on what the state should do. Social scientists and 
psychologists have identified mechanisms that can be weaponized 
                                                            
14 See also Chappell (2012, p. 72). For fuller treatment see Chappell (2012, p. 72 especially) 
and Young (2002). 
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against groups or individuals by making them feel feel heard without 
actually being heard (Trout 2013, p. 1272).  In democracy, what 
distinguishes ersatz inclusion from genuine inclusion is the autonomy 
of citizens in developing their own qualified perspectives and the 
participation in public deliberation that results in political decisions. 
A citizen can’t just parrot views fed to her by political campaigns, 
lobbyists, or mass advertising if she’s to rightly call the perspective 
she gives voice to her own. The notion that citizens’ voices are being 
heard can’t get traction unless they’re able to arrive at their 
considered views through reasoning, rather than being manipulated 
into views that will serve third parties.  
The problem for limited epistocracy is that citizens rationally 
shouldn’t develop their own perspectives on the matters where a 
specialized institution rules precisely because such perspectives won’t 
be qualified. When a body of experts like the IPCC has already told 
citizens what they should believe about their carbon emissions and 
that to reduce them they have to pay a tax, it isn’t rational for those 
citizens to spend time trying to decide what to believe, rather than 
deferring, or what to do, rather than obeying. Of course, citizens can 
make the autonomous decision to trust the specialized institutions 
regarding what ought to be done and why it ought to be done. The 
issue is that such trust is not invited, but rationally demanded. If 
that’s right, then limited epistocracy presents a special threat of 
domination by imposing duties on citizens and narrowing their 
permissions to the point where the only reasonable option is to defer 
and obey. Anything short of this sort of complete trust of the 
authority of specialized institutions in the area of their expertise and 
political power can be discounted as a violation of epistemic or 
practical rationality. The determinants of political inclusion, then, 
will be off limits, normatively speaking. 
The defender of limited epistocracy could resist this version of 
the objection by claiming that practical reasoning always involves 
premises about values or commitments— what G.E.M. Anscombe 
calls a “desirability characterization”— that lie outside of specialized 
institutions’ expertise (1957). And that’s what citizens can reason 
autonomously and deliberate about together, forming their own 
voices and making those voices heard. For example, a climate change 
 22 
denier might be epistemically irrational in rejecting the testimony of 
climate science experts regarding the relationship between carbon 
emissions from air travel and climate damage. But those experts 
aren’t moral experts. That is, they don’t have the standing to tell the 
climate change denier she ought to prioritize mitigating climate 
damage over combating other problems, like poverty and hunger. We 
might expect this to open up space for her to be autonomous in her 
practical reasoning about the state’s climate policies in a limited 
epistocracy. She can accept the premises that air travel contributes 
significantly to climate change, that climate change poses a 
significant threat to the livelihoods of people in low-lying islands and 
coasts as well as future people, and that the best means of combating 
climate change is for the government to impose a carbon tax on air 
travel, and this still allows her to resist the conclusion of the 
practical deliberation, “pay a carbon tax for air travel.” For that 
practical conclusion to be justified by the reasoning, combating 
climate change has to be characterized as wanted or desirable. And 
that characterization of prioritizing mitigating climate damage as 
desirable is what the specialized institution in a limited epistocracy 
can’t rationally compel the citizen to accept.  
I think this response is partly right, and it highlights why 
limited epistocracy fares better than wholesale epistocracy. In a 
wholesale epistocracy, the expertise claimed by governmental 
institutions is political and maybe even moral. The wise don’t just 
know how to achieve goals that citizens decide on together or agree 
to; they also know which goals the state ought to have. Although the 
more frequent criticism of wholesale epistocracy in recent literature 
has been about the difficulty of discerning who the experts are— who 
has the right account of what’s good for the nation and its citizens— 
the challenge I’ve been presenting in this section could easily be 
leveled against wholesale epistocracy. It keeps citizens from engaging 
in autonomous deliberation and choice by providing them with the 
first premises and middle terms of practical reasoning (like, “We 
ought to prioritize mitigating climate change” and, “The best way to 
mitigate climate change includes a policy that taxes carbon emissions 
for air travel), such that they’re rationally compelled to comply with 
the state’s directives. By contrast, in a limited epistocracy, the 
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specialized institutions claim epistemic authority about a subject 
matter that’s primarily non-political (e.g. environmental science, 
medicine, public health). Even if the government can fix the 
conclusion of their practical reasoning— what’s to be done— and the 
middle term of it— the reasons for which it’s to be done— the 
conclusion isn’t entailed by the premises supplied by the government, 
so it’s rationally permissible for the citizens to do what’s required but 
believe it shouldn’t be done. That may be enough to reasonably 
contest the state in a limited epistocracy.  
What’s not satisfying about this response, though, is that it 
condones the state issuing directives that citizens will end up 
rejecting because they reject a suppressed premise about value. And 
consequently, we can expect low rates of compliance with the 
specialized institutions’ directives. This is what happened with the 
Ebola crisis in Liberia: citizens with different evaluative outlooks, 
who valued spiritual health and religious rituals more than bodily 
health, refused to comply with the laws and directives issued by the 
government’s senior strategy team. In the United States, the 
Affordable Care Act, which requires Americans to have health 
insurance, took effect in 2010; but as of 2016, 11.9% of Americans 
remain uninsured (2016).  Many Americans just don’t agree with the 
underlying assumption that caring for the basic health of citizens is 
the responsibility of the federal government, or that the means the 
government should use to provide healthcare is by forcing them into 
the insurance marketplace. Over 27.5 million citizens choose to pay 
an annual penalty rather than comply with the law.  
Low rates of compliance like this threaten to seriously hamper 
the efficacy of a limited epistocracy. But the main advantage of 
limited epistocracy over democracy and other competitors is 
supposed to be efficacy. So the argument for limited epistocracy 
would be significantly weakened if, in practice, limited epistocracies 
were less effective in getting citizens to abide by the laws and policies 
generated by specialized institutions.  
 
6   Saving Political Inclusion 
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So far, I’ve defend limited epistocracy against the objections that it’s 
not truly distinct from democracy, that specialized institutions don’t 
exist, and that specialized institutions in a limited epistocracy would 
fail to be legitimate. In the previous section I attempted to offer the 
best form of the argument that limited epistocracy will undermine 
the basis for citizens’ political participation and inclusion. My aim in 
these final two sections is to propose one way to make limited 
epistocracy compatible with political inclusion.  I’ll suggest that 
imposing a constraint on the form of specialized institutions’ 
directives will ensure that citizens have space to engage in the 
political process in a meaningful way without violating rational 
requirements.  
If citizens of a limited epistocracy are going to experience 
genuine political inclusion, they’re going to need to have some 
autonomy in their deliberation and choice. As I explained earlier, if a 
citizen were rationally compelled to act as a specialized institution 
directed her and to accept on trust what the institution says are the 
reasons justifying that action, then the citizen wouldn’t be 
contributing to the process of practical reasoning and action.  At 
best, her contribution would be the choice to trust the institution— 
but when there’s no rational alternative, such a contribution is 
hardly meaningful. It’s certainly not the sort of contribution that 
could generate grounds for contesting the state.  
The situation in a limited epistocracy isn’t unlike the situation 
of parents trying to balance producing good outcomes for their 
children with providing them the opportunity autonomous choices. A 
parent/child analogy can help shed light on a strategy for making 
limited epistocracy compatible with individual autonomy in the right 
way.  
 
Academic Parent: Josh is a preteen whose mother researches 
sleep disorders in adolescents. Josh’s mother tells him he needs 
to be in bed by ten on school nights to get the right amount of 
sleep and she has the standing to demand that he try to get 
that amount of sleep on school nights.  
 
 25 
Compare Josh’s situation with that of his friends. When their parents 
set a bedtime, they can always challenge them about whether that’s 
in their best interest without epistemic irrationality. These kids have 
a chance to contest their parents’ rules by questioning the grounds 
for the rules through their own reasoning and inquiry. Josh’s friends 
may be epistemically irrational to disbelieve Josh’s mother when she 
tells them when the should be going to bed; yet she doesn’t have the 
standing to make them actually go to bed when they should. But 
Josh has to believe what his mother tells him and do what she tells 
him to do in light of what she says he should believe. One way Josh’s 
mother might try to help him develop autonomy is to give him some 
options. She can say, “Okay, Josh; you can either go to bed at ten, go 
to bed later and take a nap when you get home from school, or stay 
up late and suffer the consequences.” Of course, if she includes the 
last option for too long, of course, and Josh doesn’t learn to value the 
health benefits of sleep for himself by suffering from sleep 
deprivation, then she won’t be striking a balance between conferring 
the benefits of her knowledge on her son and allowing him to become 
more autonomous.  
In the same way, we might think that specialized institutions 
in a limited epistocracy could offer citizens multiple ways of acting 
on the basis of the reasons that are inscrutable to them. That would 
provide them with space to practice rational deliberation and choice. 
Unlike in the Academic Parent case, though, there’s a problem with 
specialized institutions allowing citizens to make poor choices, 
because the poor choices of citizens can drastically affect the lives of 
fellow citizens. Whereas Josh is primarily the one who will suffer the 
consequences if he opts to stay up late and not take naps, citizens in 
a limited epistocracy might keep fellow citizens from experiencing the 
full benefits of a limited epistocracy if they choose to not comply 
with the specialized institutions’ policies and suffer the consequences 
(as when US citizens opt to pay the penalty for not getting health 
insurance and drive the costs of insurance up for others). Is there a 
way for specialized institutions to give citizens options while still 
producing better outcomes than democratic governments?  
I think there is. To see how this can be done, we first need to 
recognize that an important but often overlooked feature of practical 
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reasoning is that we can “throw the process into reverse.” That is, we 
can see what action follows from commitments and beliefs we have, 
and without rational mistake, abandon one of those commitments 
because we want to avoid the conclusion. Say, for example, I’m en 
route to a friend’s house for dinner and I form the intention to pick 
up flowers for her. I have a commitment— (1) bring something nice 
to dinner— and a relevant belief— (2) flowers are nice— that lead 
me to form a further commitment—  (3) bring flowers to dinner. 
Then, I realize that the flower shop is out of the way and if I stop in 
to buy flowers, I’ll be late. Now I think: (4) if I bring flowers, then 
I’ll arrive late; and the natural commitment that follows is that I (6) 
arrive late. Instead of accepting the conclusion, though, I’m perfectly 
free to rethink things and do away with my commitment to (4) bring 
flowers to dinner.15 Notice how this is unlike theoretical reasoning. If 
I had reason to believe (1) today is Monday and (2) I’m going to 
dinner with my partner on Monday, and I reasoned from this that 
(3) I’m going to dinner with my partner today, I couldn’t simply 
abandon one of the premises because I didn’t want the conclusion to 
be true (perhaps because I also promised my friend I would meet her 
for dinner tonight). Philosophers observe that practical reasoning, 
unlike theoretical reasoning, generates requirements that are “wide in 
scope”— they require coherence among your synchronic beliefs and 
commitments, but allow you to change commitments over time. 
What if the directives of specialized institutions, then, were 
wide in scope, providing the kind of normative openness 
characteristic of practical reasoning? I want to suggest that the 
                                                            
15 John Broome has characterized this feature in terms of the “wide scope” of rational 
requirements (2007). When a requirement of rationality is wide in scope, it takes the form 
“ought (if p then q)” where the ought ranges over the conditional, rather than distributing. 
“Ought (if p then q)” isn’t equivalent to “if ought p then ought q.” Take p to be “bring 
flowers to dinner” and q to be “arrive late.” It would be irrational of me to maintain at once 
an intention to bring flowers to dinner and to not arrive late. But, it is perfectly rational for 
me to get rid of the intention to bring flowers (p), once I see that it’s in conflict with my 
intention to arrive on time (~q). If the requirement were narrow in scope, then once I’d 
formed the intention to bring flowers, I’d be bound to intend to be late since it follows from 
bringing flowers. Wide-scoping does away with the difficulty of making a person stuck with 
a premise once she’s adopted it, come what may. Richardson says, “In this way, wide-scope 
requirements attempt to model the openness of reasoning, which can be thrown into reverse. 
Reasoning is thus, we might say, freely conducted,” (Richardson 2012, p. 96). 
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notion of wide-scope requirements can help us articulate a way 
specialized institutions can respect citizens’ autonomy without 
capitulating to demands which are unreasonable or will render the 
laws and policies ineffective. Suppose the epistemic requirement to 
believe the experts in a specialized institution is narrow in scope. 
That is, the specialized institution can’t just say to citizens, “believe 
what you will about the effectiveness of mosquito nets in preventing 
malaria” or “you don’t have to take my word for it that this 
immigration policy will increase the national debt significantly.” The 
verdicts of specialized institutions on social scientific or hard 
scientific facts should serve as premises in citizens’ reasoning.  
We can still protect citizens’ autonomy by granting them the 
ability to choose what follows from the beliefs they form trusting 
specialized institutions— that is, if the institutional directives offer 
multiple routes for compliance. In the case of my deliberating about 
whether to bring flowers to dinner, I have the freedom to choose to 
be late but bring flowers, or to come bearing no gifts but arrive on 
time. Perhaps my choice will reflect what I value more— punctuality 
or hospitality. So too, when laws and policies provide citizens with 
multiple options, they can make choices that reflect their individual 
values and commitments.  
To put it slightly more technically but more precisely, I 
suggest the directives of specialized institutions should create duties 
that take the form, “ought (if p, then phi) or ought (if q, then psi)” 
where p and q represent evaluative beliefs outside the specialized 
institution’s area of expertise and phi and psi are courses of action. 
Or the duties created by the directives might be put in the negative: 
“ought not (if p, then not phi) and ought not (if q, then not psi).” 
Laws and policies of this form secure space for citizens to make 
autonomous decisions about what to do on the basis of what matters 
to them. This gives us the following criterion to ensure that limited 
epistocracy is compatible with the main determinant of political 
inclusion: 
 
Conditional Form Thesis: A directive of a specialized 
institution adequately respects autonomy iff it is a disjunction 
of conditionals, “ϕ or ψ,” such that citizens have a wide-scope 
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obligation to ϕ if they have certain evaluative beliefs and to ψ 
if they have contrary evaluative beliefs. 
 
It seems like if the epistocratic branch of government in 
limited epistocracy satisfies the Conditional Form Thesis, it will be 
able to maximize good outcomes afforded by specialized knowledge 
without cutting off citizens’ autonomous deliberation and choice.  
 
7  Refining the Conditional Form Thesis 
The Conditional Form Thesis will certainly carry limited epistocracy 
closer to the ideal of a state that outperforms democracy while still 
realizing the value of political inclusion of the citizens. Still, 
democrats might worry that one of the problems with wholesale 
epistocracy—what’s called “the demographic objection”— also plagues 
this version of limited epistocracy. To respond to this concern I want 
to add a further amendment to the Conditional Form Thesis in this 
final section.  
Estlund puts the demographic objection to epistocracy this 
way: 
 
“The Demographic Objection: The educated portion of the 
populace may disproportionately have epistemically damaging 
features that countervail the admitted epistemic benefits of 
education,” (2003). 
 
The demographic objection need not be necessarily or conceptually 
true; but as long as it’s contingently true here and now, and 
democracy can do better, it’s a weighty reason against adopting 
epistocracy.16 The correlation between being part of the educated 
elite and, say, racism or sexism poses a serious threat to political 
inclusion.  
                                                            
16 It’s far from clear that the demographic objection does the democrat any favors. Thomas 
Mulligan has argued that the demographic objection proves too much, as not even 
democracy can escape the criticism. Mulligan cites extensive evidence from researchers like 
Bryan Caplan that shows the biases that undermine the epistemic value we might attach to 
democracy on the basis of Condorcet’s theorem regarding aggregation of knowledge (2015).  
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Plausibly, the demographic objection applies to limited 
epistocracy because conjectural features could be present among 
experts housed within specialized institutions. In many countries, to 
rise in the ranks of disciplines in which specialized institutions house 
expertise (medicine, public health, social sciences) requires costly 
education. A dearth of experts from underprivileged backgrounds 
could justify a concern that the people running specialized 
institutions won’t be sufficiently sensitive to interests of the least well 
off— or worse, that they’ll be biased against the underprivileged 
class.  
Second, in fields like engineering and computer science with 
growing relevance to problems national governments need to solve, 
the workforce is overwhelmingly populated by a single demographic. 
In the United States, in 2013 51% of those employed in science and 
engineering were white males, as compared with 20% white women, 
3% black men, 2% black women, 4% hispanic men, and 2% hispanic 
women. With so little representation, black and hispanic minorities 
as well as women could have their concerns systematically overlooked 
by specialized institutions in science and engineering. And yet, it 
stands to reason that if that happened it would be exceedingly 
difficult to pin down the source of the bias, as the outputs of a 
specialized institution depend on complex consolidation and synthesis 
of information that no single person could fully understand the 
reasons supporting them.  
Third, as mounting evidence suggests that conservatism and 
traditional religions tend to be underrepresented in academia in the 
West, it would be reasonable for conservatives and religious persons 
to worry that specialized institutions will discriminate against them. 
If specialized institutions issued directives and made laws that failed 
to consider these points of view, they might have a legitimate worry 
that they wouldn’t be able to live out their commitments.17   
On one way of thinking about the demographic objection, the 
problem is not simply unequal representation of demographic groups 
but rather that such inequality in representation will result in 
                                                            
17 See Shields and Dunn, Passing On the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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underrepresented groups not being able to live according to their 
deeply held values because their voices aren’t heard.  
The Conditional Form Thesis doesn’t seem to help limited 
epistocracy on this front. Return to the example of the Ebola 
outbreak in Liberia. Imagine that the epistocratic branch of the 
government issues a directive like, “Either (if you value physical 
health and believe in the use of Western medicine, evacuate) or (if 
you value local religious rituals and the use of traditional medicine, 
then pay a fine to subsidize the cost of evacuations of others).” This 
fits the Conditional Form Thesis.  
The obvious problem with the directive is that it threatens to 
marginalize certain religious and cultural groups. It imposes a serious 
burden on those who don’t accept modern Western medicine and 
who are part of the religious minority, while using the financial gains 
from that group to lessen the burden of the majority. If some cultural 
or religious groups have parochial reasons to stay near to their 
communities during crisis rather than evacuate because of their 
particular values or commitments, then they incur a huge cost. What 
if they aren’t able to pay the penalty? Neither option will be a live 
option, compatible with their evaluative commitments. While the 
reasons the experts have for issuing these two options may be non-
arbitrary, the effect is to limit the liberties of some groups 
disproportionately. Those in the religious or cultural minority will 
have reason to feel disenfranchised and excluded, even if in some 
meager sense they retain the autonomy necessary for political 
inclusion.  
To achieve robust political inclusion, such groups need to be 
guaranteed some latitude in their deliberation and decision-making 
that doesn’t conflict with their reasonably held commitments and 
values. The alternatives a specialized institution provides in its 
directive, then, ought to be genuinely actionable and not require that 
people give up their reasoned fundamental commitments if we’re to 
sidestep the demographic objection.  
 
Conditional Form Thesis*: A directive of a specialized 
institution adequately respects autonomy iff it is conditional in 
form, generating a wide scope requirement that S (if p then Φ) 
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or (if q then ψ), and both Φ and ψ are actions S can do 
willingly without foregoing her reasonable fundamental 
commitments. 
 
On Conditional Form Thesis*, the strongest version of a 
directive specialized institutions are permitted to issue gives citizens 
real options. It should provide as many options as necessary to 
guarantee that minority groups with contrary evaluative outlooks or 
perspectives can make a choice that’s consistent with their identity 
and commitments.  
An advantage of Conditional Form Thesis* is that citizens can 
fairly experiment with different responses to the same information 
and even help to generate suggestions to the specialized institution 
for further options. For instance, if the US were to authorize the 
IPCC to set limits on citizens’ annual carbon emissions, in 
deliberating between various options, citizens might come up with 
new, creative ways to offset and reduce their emissions. This kind of 
creative thinking would be unmotivated if citizens were just told 
what carbon taxes to pay and why to pay them. Groups with 
conflicting interests—those who rely on fossil fuels for their income, 
for example—won’t feel automatically marginalized and so robbed of 
their inclusion in democratic decision-making if there are options that 
can really serve as the conclusion of a practical syllogism from the 
facts the IPCC gives citizens and the citizens’ reasoned commitments 
and priorities. They might gather to publically deliberate about 
additional options for carbon-emissions offsets that suit their 
particular lifestyle, only furthering the value of political inclusion, 
rather than having their autonomous deliberation and choice stifled 
prematurely.  
The defender of limited epistocracy can respond to the 
demographic objection using the Conditional Form Thesis*. Of 
course, she doesn’t have to; if some other constraint accomplishes the 
same goal— providing room for citizens with varying viewpoints and 
backgrounds to make reasonable choices about what to do— then 
limited epistocracy with that constraint will come out on top.  
Another way of thinking of the demographic objection is that 
the simple inequality of viewpoints is something distasteful, 
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unpalatable. Limited epistocracy can do away with this problem 
more easily: the influence of a specialized institution is narrow—it 
only reaches as far as the bounds of its expertise. So even if a 
specialized institution is demographically more homogenous than the 
population, the effects of the homogeneity aren’t sufficiently 
widespread to merit the kind of concern Estlund raises for general 
epistocracies.18 
 
8  Conclusion 
 Limited epistocracy as rule by specialized institutions offers citizens 
benefits that democracy won’t be able to, since the electorate doesn’t 
have the relevant competence in areas like technology, public health, 
medicine, and environmental sustainability. This puts democrats at a 
disadvantage. On the one hand, they can concede that they’re willing 
to forego the kind of solutions to complex, multidimensional 
problems that would secure citizens’ wellbeing for the sake of 
extremely robust political participation of all. Such a concession is 
counterintuitive, for when the level of public discourse about pressing 
issues betrays lack of understanding on the part of the electorate, I’m 
inclined to be less certain of the value of robust participation in 
decision-making. On the other hand, democrats could accept that in 
these situations the government ought to defer to non-elected expert 
bodies, and that these bodies shouldn’t be subject to the check of 
partisan elected officials or popular referendum. But in doing so, 
democrats would be admitting that participation that goes beyond 
the kind of political inclusion a limited epistocracy can realize isn’t 
necessary. And that’s a surprising result.    
I’ve sought to defend limited epistocracy because I think it’s 
important to consider the normative status of the kinds of 
institutions we build and empower in response to complex issues like 
climate change, global epidemics, and public health crises. Since these 
institutions so seriously shape the lives of citizens by altering their 
permissions and duties, we’re justified in wondering what makes their 
exercises of practical and epistemic authority legitimate, and whether 
they can achieve the beneficial outcomes they generate without 
                                                            
18 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this advantage of limited 
epistocracy as compared to general epistocracy.  
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dominating ordinary non-experts. Chiefly, if we value political 
inclusion it’s crucial that we make sure that these institutions don’t 
become mechanisms for imposing biased agendas on those who aren’t 
among the experts in those fields. 
If limited epistocracy is worth pursuing, then we’ll need 
innovative ways to resolve apparent conflicts between democratic 
ideals and rule by experts. I’ve suggested that limiting the form of 
directives and laws issued by specialized institutions is one way to 
keep the democratic value of political inclusion alive within a limited 
epistocracy. Defenders of democracy or republican government may 
come up with further values that those forms of government realize, 
making them desirable even if limited epistocracy produces better 
outcomes. The limited epistocrat can always use the argumentative 
strategy I’ve employed here: consider whether the value could be 
made compatible with epistocratic rule without giving up the efficacy 
of epistocracy. 
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